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NICHOLSON V. WILLIAMS: THE CASE
JILL M. ZUCCARDYt

I am an attorney at Sanctuary for Families, a multi-disciplinary
agency in New York City. Sanctuary provides shelter, counseling, children's programs, job readiness counseling and legal services to domestic
violence victims and their children. It was founded in 1985. At that
time, Sanctuary did not include a legal services component. In 1989,
University of Denver Sturm College of Law professor Kris Miccio
founded Sanctuary's legal center, called the Center for Battered
Women's Legal Services. Our legal center has grown to nineteen attorneys now and, to our knowledge, is the largest legal services provider in
the country serving exclusively victims of domestic violence. We work
collaboratively with the clinical side of the agency to provide families
with holistic services.
I am the Director of Sanctuary's Child Protection Project, which focuses on issues related to domestic violence and child welfare. And, as
mentioned, I was trial and appellate co-counsel in Nicholson v. Williams,1 which challenged as unconstitutional the removal of children
from and the prosecution of, battered mothers solely or primarily because
the mothers had been victims of domestic violence in the presence of
their children. Of course, there are so many things to be said and discussed about Nicholson, as evidenced by the mere fact of this Symposium, but I will focus my comments today on how the Nicholson case
unfolded, our theories and our proofs.
In 1995, as mentioned, Professor Miccio was one of the first to
identify a disturbing trend in child welfare cases involving domestic violence in New York State, a trend which was being repeated throughout
the country. In an article published in the Albany Law Review, she highlighted that domestic violence victims were being charged with child
neglect for failing to protect their children from exposure to domestic
violence.2 This burgeoning trend reached its tipping point in New York
in 1998 with a state court case called In re Lonell j. 3 In In re Lonell J.,
both mother and father, victim and abuser, were charged with child net Director, Child Protection Project, Sanctuary for Families, New York City. The following
is a transcript of remarks made on March 3, 2005 at the Denver University Law Review Symposium,
"Children and the Courts: Is Our System Truly Just?"
1.
203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
2.
Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and Children: Deconstructing the Myth of the
PassiveBatteredMother and the "ProtectedChild" in Child Neglect Proceedings, 58 ALB. L. REV.
1087, 1088-90 (1995).
3.
673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (App. Div. 1998).
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glect. Along with some vague and unsupported allegations of medical
neglect, the neglect petition alleged that the respondent father had beaten
the mother and that she had failed to separate from him, and that the respondent father was arrested for beating her.
After trial in In re Lonell J., which included little testimony even to
establish the facts of the domestic violence or the children's exposure to
4
it, the family court reluctantly dismissed the petition. The family court
held that domestic violence between the parents was not sufficient to
establish neglect of the children unless there was testimony from an expert that the children's witnessing of the violence had caused them emo-5
child neglect statute.
tional or mental impairment as defined by our
However, while noting that it was constrained by New York law from
finding neglect under the circumstances of this case, the family court
used the decision to "beseech the legislature to amend the definition of
neglect to include domestic violence which does not involve physical
6
harm or the imminent risk of physical harm to children" _ i.e., to amend
our child abuse statutes to make domestic violence in the presence of a
child per se child neglect.
The child welfare agency, which in New York is called the Administration for Children's Services (ACS), appealed. The appellate court
reversed, holding that expert testimony was not required to establish that
the children had suffered harm and that nothing in the law required7 exof neglect.",
pert testimony "as opposed to other convincing evidence
What the court actually held in In re Lonell J. was that expert proof
of emotional harm due to exposure to domestic violence is not required
to establish neglect.8 But ACS decided that the holding in In re Lonell J.
meant that the element of harm, the requirement that there be proof that
there was harm or imminent harm to a child, was done away with altogether in cases involving domestic violence; and, that a child's exposure
to domestic violence was per se neglectful on the part of the abuser parent and on the part of the victim parent. ACS went even further, deciding
that the potential for emotional harm to a child from witnessing domestic
violence was so high that ACS could do away with the requirement of a
court order before removing the child from the parent who was the victim of the violence. That is, ACS decided that it could do away with the
requirement of due process. And that it could simply remove children
from a home any time domestic violence was found and go to court later.
Shortly after In re Lonell J, other appellate courts rendered decisions which, short on discussion of the facts or law, appeared to endorse
4.
5.

MatterofLatishaJ. andLonellJ, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 16, 1997, at 28, 28.
See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(f)(i) (McKinney 2005).

6.
7.

Id.
In re Lonell J., 242 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
Id.

8.
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something close to a per se standard as well, 9 and we were off and running.
We knew that battered mothers in other states and counties were
facing the same problems, biases and judgments as battered mothers in
New York. In other jurisdictions, and early on in New York, these cases
were called "failure to protect" cases. Battered mothers were charged
with failure to protect their children from the potential emotional harm of
being exposed to domestic violence. ACS was also alleging "failure to
protect," but it phrased its charge in a different way. ACS claimed that a
battered mother was neglectful because she "engaged in domestic violence in the presence of her children." In choosing this language to describe the victim's role in her own assault, ACS said very clearly what
other jurisdictions were saying more obliquely: the victim is equally responsible for any violence in the home. She fails to protect her children
if she is unable to stop another person from being violent.
In New York City, there had been another development leading up
to the almost hysterical atmosphere of removal in which we found ourselves in 1998 when In re Lonell J. came down. The highly-publicized
death of a child had led to the creation of ACS, a new child welfare
agency, in 1996. In New York City, whenever there's a death of a child,
the government changes the name of the child welfare agency. I've been
practicing law for fifteen years and I've been through four child welfare
agencies -- BCW, SSC, CWA and, finally, ACS.
The new agency - ACS - issued a mission statement that said any
ambiguities regarding safety of children shall be resolved in favor of
removal. Now, this is an incredible policy statement and one which we
believe to be unconstitutional, because it does away with the requirement
of probable cause. We believe, on its face, that that policy statement is
unconstitutional. And the frontline workers indeed took it as a license to
search and seize children at will, and as an elimination of the need for
any court order authorizing removal or, really, any justification for removal beyond an ambiguity. Of course, every domestic violence situation is fraught with ambiguity. So, the mission statement combined with
the misread holding of In re Lonell J. and its progeny had a devastating
impact on children who were exposed to domestic violence and their
mothers who were the victims of it. It was this combination that led to a
frenzy of removals in child welfare cases involving domestic violence.
That was the legal landscape when, in 1999, I met Sharwline
Nicholson. Sharwline had been separated from her child's father for
some time. He lived in South Carolina. Although he had not been a

9.
See, e.g., In re Athena M., 678 N.Y.S.2d 11, 12 (App. Div. 1998); In re Deandre T., 676
N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (App. Div. 1998).
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model partner during the relationship, he was never physically abusive
toward her or threatened physical abuse during the relationship.
From time to time after Sharwline and her child's father separated,
he came to New York to visit his infant daughter. During one visit, he
got into an argument with Sharwline and became enraged. He beat her
very badly. She managed to call 911, and he took off. Her son was at
school and her infant daughter was asleep in the other room.
Sharwline was very seriously injured. She had a broken arm; she
had a concussion; she was bleeding from numerous wounds. Yet, even
before the police arrived, her first thought was of her children. She
called her neighbor, who was her regular child care provider, and had the
neighbor come over, get the baby and pick up the son from school.
Sharwline was removed by ambulance, thinking that her children were
safely with the babysitter. She provided every piece of information she
could think of so that the police could capture the abuser, although she
believed that he immediately fled the state.
While Sharwline was in the hospital, the police-and to this day we
don't know why-went to the neighbor's home with their guns drawn
and took custody of the children. This all sounds incredible, but it's true.
They called Sharwline at the hospital and said, "We have your children
here at the precinct. We can't allow them to be in the custody of a
stranger," which is not an accurate statement of New York law by any
means. A fit parent has the right to make child care arrangements for his
or her child. In any event, they said, "You have to call a relative to take
care of the children."
So, Sharwline called her cousin in New Jersey. By now, it was ten
or eleven o'clock at night. Sharwline's cousin went to the hospital, told
Sharwline that she would go to the precinct and get the children and everything would be okay. However, when Sharwline's cousin went to the
precinct, the police refused to release the children, saying the children
could not be taken out of state to New Jersey. Again, this was not a
proper statement of the law.
Sharwline received a telephone call early the next morning-and
the person on the other end of the line said, "This is ACS. We have your
children. If you want to see them, you'll need to go to court. We'll call
you back and tell you the date." Sharwline immediately left the hospital
against medical advice and went off in search of her children. ACS did
not file in court until five days later. So, Sharwline had five days during
which she did not know where her children were or whether they were
being cared for.
When Sharwline finally had an opportunity to appear in court, she
learned that she had been charged with child neglect for "engaging in
domestic violence." Make no mistake. Sharwline was not accused of
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perpetrating any violence. She was accused of being a victim and she
was accused of being a neglectful mother because she was a victim.
Now, at that time, I had just started working at Sanctuary. In the
early 1990's, I previously had worked in the field of child welfare. And I
found it so draining and so frustrating, because the system was so biased
in favor of the child welfare agency that, after a particularly difficult
case, I quit. And I went off and worked as a secretary for six months, as
a temp, to try to figure out what I could do, because I did not think I
could go back to child welfare. And for the next several years, I steered
clear of it, returning to legal services but as a housing attorney and, later,
supervising pro bono attorneys in family court.
When I got Sharwline's case, I was blown away. I read the transcript of the first court appearance in family court when I represented
her. I'm sputtering, "Your Honor, this is outrageous! I-I can't believe
this." And having been away from the field for a while, you know, I was
very nafve about what was going on. I knew the child welfare system
was crazy, but I couldn't believe it was that crazy.
So, I thought the case was some sort of aberration, some sort of a
mistake. But as Sharwline's story unfolded over the next nine months
that it took to get the charges against her dismissed, so did the stories of
many other survivors. I am not going to go over all of them, because
they're in the opinion, if you want to read them. But there are a few
worth mentioning.
Ekaete Udoh, a Nigerian woman, had five daughters and was married to a very strict and punitive Nigerian man, who believed he had a
right to take a second wife because his wife had only produced daughters
for him. He was very free in admitting that this was the reason that he
would beat her, because she wouldn't consent to his taking of a second
wife. We had been representing Mrs. Udoh at the legal center for a year
or so. She had been to court approximately twenty-three times to try to
get him excluded from the home, to try to get child support, and to try to
get visitation limited. And, even with excellent legal advocacy, she was
unsuccessful in getting any meaningful relief from the court system.
After she was evicted, she had to return to the marital home with her five
daughters.
There was another incident of abuse-and in this incident, he hit the
child. Mrs. Udoh reported the incident to the police but her husband was
not arrested. However, a teacher reported the incident to ACS. ACS
came to the home and, with no investigation, removed all four of her
minor children. Mrs. Udoh was charged with child neglect for "engaging
in domestic violence" for twenty-five years.
Sharlene Tillett was another one of our class members in the
Nicholson case. She was hit while she was pregnant. After she gave
birth, she was charged with engaging in domestic violence in the pres-
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ence of her unborn child. That child was placed in foster care and mom
and child missed the first several months of the child's life - several
months of bonding and breast feeding gone forever.
Bizarrely, we also encountered women who were charged with engaging in domestic violence in the presence of their children but, after
the women left, ACS placed their children in the abuser's custody. The
theory was that once the parents were separated, there were no more
problems. So, we even had cases like that; and so on, and so on, and so
on.

In the class action which ultimately came to pass, we never ran out
of plaintiffs. The City is fond of saying that there were only ten class
members in the Nicholson case because the judge chose to only tell the
stories of ten women. But there were not ten class members. There were
probably hundreds. There were at least close to a hundred that we knew
of. Now, the theory in all of these cases was that the children were suffering, or in danger of suffering, emotional harm from exposure to domestic violence against their mothers and, therefore, should be removed
from their mothers. These were not cases in which the City alleged that
the children were in danger of physical harm, or that the mother had
failed to protect the child from physical harm. Rather, they all focused
on the presumption that exposure to domestic violence, per se, constituted impairment rising to the level of imminent harm and neglect under
our child welfare statutes.
After the neglect charges against Sharwline Nicholson were dismissed in state court, she retained the public interest law firm Lansner &
Kubitschek in New York City to represent her in a civil rights damages
action. Lansner & Kubitschek is well known in New York City for its
success in civil rights actions involving children, including not only
unlawful removals, but also abuse in foster care. I had worked with them
before. They are a true public interest law firm dedicated to social justice in so many ways, and they were outraged by what was going on with
Sharwline and the other mothers. After the charges against Mrs. Udoh
were dismissed, she and her children also retained Lansner & Kubitschek
and filed a lawsuit, and then Ms. Tillett and her children did the same.
Our clients had the extremely good fortune to be assigned Judge
Jack B. Weinstein in the Eastern District of New York to hear the case.
This was a random assignment, but someone must have been looking out
for us. Judge Weinstein is a prominent jurist with a distinguished career
which included creative, bold and, occasionally unpopular, rulings.
Judge Weinstein was once called the quintessential activist judge by the
New York Times. If anyone would listen, he would.
As we identified more and more of these mothers and children who
had been separated after domestic violence in the home, we considered
that Judge Weinstein might be receptive to a motion for class certifica-
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tion. Ultimately, on January 19, 2001, we filed the motion on behalf of
all battered mothers and their children, who had been separated or were
in danger of being separated solely or primarily because of domestic
violence in the home. Sanctuary signed on officially as co-counsel with
Lansner & Kubitschek for the lawsuit. Lansner & Kubitschek brought
the child welfare expertise to the table, and Sanctuary brought the domestic violence expertise.
Our contentions were, in sum, that ACS was employing a policy
and a practice of removing children from battered mothers solely or primarily because the mothers had been abused; of making those removals
without court order; of charging those mothers with child neglect for
engaging in domestic violence; and of marking cases "indicated" against
the mothers in the state register of child abuse and maltreatment.
This final element of the case related to the marking of cases against
mothers in the state central register is one that gets lost in the shuffle
sometimes. These moms, upon investigation, were being blacklisted-we
call it a blacklist-by the State Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment. The cases are marked as having some credible evidence that
the subject of the report is neglectful or abusive. And this impacts the
mother's ability to ever get a job working with children which, for many
of our clients who work in jobs related to child care, is a real problem.
We sought injunctive relief on behalf of the class. Many of the
mothers also had individual damages actions. The damages claims were
separated out. This was not a class action about money; it was a class
action about an injunction.
Now, if anyone is familiar with Judge Weinstein you will not be
surprised to hear what happened when we appeared in April of 2001 on
our class certification motion.
The court fast-tracked the case and announced that on July 9, 2001
we would start a trial on the issues of whether class certification should
be granted, and whether a preliminary injunction should be granted. We
had very little time, three months, to conduct discovery, develop our theory, locate our experts, and find more class members. The case was tried
primarily by me and by David Lansner, Carolyn Kubitschek and others
in their firm. We were in court by day and in depositions by night.
Now, you all aren't out practicing in the field yet, so you might not yet
appreciate this. You'll remember this when you're working your twelvehour days what it would be like to be on trial by day, go have some dinner, meet for a deposition at six o'clock, deposition's over at ten, wait for
the transcript till two in the morning, prepare your cross-examination and
then go to court the next morning and, you know, conduct a trial. It was
quite a wild ride.
We used some very unique methods of witness preparation, such as
holding a Fourth of July barbeque for class members and their children,
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who then met, one by one, with David Lansner, me and other attorneys in
separate rooms to be prepared for trial. As a practical matter, this was
important because it allowed us to prepare the moms without concern
about child care issues and scheduling conflicts, but it was also important
that the moms could see the faces of other mothers and draw strength
from one another.
The trial lasted for nearly two months and encompassed forty-four
witnesses, including twelve experts, and hundreds of documents. As one
of our first witnesses, we called a former family court judge, Philip
Segal, who had presided over nearly ten thousand child welfare cases
during his time on the bench. We called him to familiarize the court with
the realities of family court and to provide evidence as to the number of
cases that had come before him during his time on the bench in which a
battered mother was charged with engaging in domestic violence.
However, as Judge Segal described the experience in family court
of a battered mother who had her children removed, often illegally,
Judge Weinstein became very disturbed. It was clear that battered mothers in New York were not receiving adequate representation from assigned counsel. In New York, indigent litigants in family court have a
right, a statutory right, to assigned counsel. New York State, however,
paid assigned counsel only twenty-five dollars an hour for out-of-court
work, and forty dollars an hour for in-court work. A state court case
which was challenging these rates had been languishing for years, and
legislative action seemed very unlikely.
Previously, we had considered including the issue of inadequate
representation in our complaint. Many of the women would appear in
court but because the rates were so low, there was a dearth of assigned
counsel. So a case would be adjourned, adjourned, adjourned-with no
substantive inquiry whatsoever into the facts of the case, while the court
officers would literally run around the courthouse trying to find an attorney who was willing to take on the case for that little money. We had
rejected including this claim in the suit as potentially complicating the
issues.
But, after the family court judge's testimony, and Judge Weinstein's
reaction to it, we moved to amend the complaint and join the state as a
defendant on the grounds that, in addition to the city's misdeeds, the state
was providing unconstitutionally inadequate representation.
Why was this issue important? Because Judge Weinstein, as a federal court judge, could only affect ACS behavior before the agency
reached the state courthouse door. Once the government passed the
threshold of the state court door, the state court took over, and the issue
of whether the rights of battered mothers would be protected once they
were in state court was imperative. And not insignificant was the fact
that the inclusion of this issue in the lawsuit made the legal community
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sit up and take notice. A most cynical view of that is that once attorneys'
fees were involved, we started to get more publicity in the legal press.
During Nicholson, the city put forth one defense only, "We don't do
this. We don't remove children solely or primarily because of domestic
violence, period." The city said, "We employ best practices. Look at
our written policies." And, in fact, except for the mission statement that
I referred to earlier, the ACS domestic violence policies and guiding
principles looked really good on paper. Thus, it made the case simpler
for us that ACS actually agreed with us as to what constituted best practices in child welfare cases involving domestic violence. They claimed
they already employed them; we claimed that they didn't.
Judge Weinstein early on expressed his skepticism about our ability
to prove our case without statistics. Unfortunately, there were few statistics to speak of. ACS did not keep reliable records on how many cases
involved domestic violence; how many times they removed children
from battered mothers; or, how many moms were charged with engaging
in domestic violence. In claiming that there was no municipal policy,
ACS relied almost exclusively upon a state study of domestic violence
cases which had been languishing for about a year. This state study had
been mandated as an afterthought by the legislature on another piece of
legislation years earlier. It was not a serious study. It consisted of untrained college students on a three-week winter break one January reviewing seventy-one cases involving domestic violence. The study had
not been completed or published. The study concluded that in only one
instance out of seventy-one cases was a child removed because of domestic violence.
The City defendants repeated the words "state study" like a mantra
throughout the entire litigation. In fact, they continued to do so throughout the appeals.
Even after the Second Circuit confirmed Judge
Weinstein's findings that they had a pattern and practice of removing
children from their mothers solely or primarily because the mothers had
been victims of domestic violence, they continued to talk about this state
study. They talked about it to the media; they talked about it in the appellate courts. It was the one-note song that they had.
During the trial it was my job to debunk the study. With the help of
a statistics expert, we challenged shoddy methodology. But, we also
demanded that the seventy-one case files which formed the basis for the
study be produced to us and, nearly on the eve of trial, they arrived. We
divvied them up among paralegals, law students and attorneys and read
them very carefully.
We found that the state's definition of when removal occurred
solely or primarily because of domestic violence was very generous to
the city. For example, in one case the father beat up the mother while he
was drunk. The state study concluded this was not a removal because of
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domestic violence; it was a removal because of domestic violence and
alcohol abuse. So, we had a social worker who was qualified as an expert and who was a former child protective worker review the files, especially the ones that were problematic, and she testified about those particular cases and helped us undermine the validity of the state study's
substantive findings.
Now, we, of course, were seeking to prove that there was a broad
enough constitutional violation to warrant certification of the class. If I
was asked once, I was asked a million times, "How big is the class? How
many women are affected?" We couldn't answer that question. We
didn't have the statistics. However, again, those of you familiar with
Judge Weinstein will not be surprised to learn what happened at trial.
Judge Weinstein, in his brilliance, turned this piece of statistical
evidence on its head. He accepted the state study on its face as the city
urged. In the middle of testimony, he then extrapolated from the city's
numbers and he came up with eighty families a year that, by the City's
own data, were affected by this policy.
I was in the middle of my brilliant cross-examination, having had a
crash course in statistics over the course of a few days, and I had about
ten pages of cross-examination left where I was going to use words like
"inter-rater reliability study," and things like that. After the judge's
comments, I took the notes, and I folded them up and I said, "Nothing
further,"-and a short time later, we became a class action. Ultimately,
the judge said, "That's a lot of mothers. It doesn't need to be hundreds
and thousands of mothers. That's enough. It's probably bigger than that
and, you know, the plaintiffs have made some good points, but 1 think
that's fine."
The city also waved its written policies like a banner throughout the
case. And, as I mentioned, their written policies were actually pretty
good. The problem was the disconnection between the written policies
and the actual policies and practices. We illustrated this disconnection in
three ways. First, of course, our class members testified about their experiences. Second, we had our experts. And, even one of their experts
testified that the practices in the class members' cases were not consistent with the written policies. But, third, to prove the broader constitutional violation, we focused our case on, and as calling as our witnesses,
child protective managers at ACS who were involved in some of the
cases of the class members. The child protective managers are third
level supervisors who sign off on all removals.
Deposing them and questioning them at trial might have been fun, if
it wasn't so sad. They were naYvely honest, believing that their actions
were righteous. Some had not seen the agency's written domestic violence policies or, if they had, were only vaguely familiar with them. The
child protective managers' description of the agency's practices with
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regard to domestic violence supported our contentions, and since each
child protective manager was responsible for twenty-five case workers,
each with a caseload of some fifteen to twenty cases, the child protective
managers' understanding and implementation of policy in domestic violence cases took us a long way to the finish line. Ultimately, we had five
of them testify at the trial.
Another striking moment for me as an attorney in the trial was as I
was cross-examining a child protective manager who said that sometimes
he removed children from battered mothers without ever going to court,
because if you remove their children, battered mothers tend to do what
you want them to do. That was another instance of restraint as a lawyer
where I had to say, "Nothing further." You're standing there listening to
this fellow and you think, "He did not just say that," but, alas, he did.
Incredibly, the city never disavowed or explained the actions of
their staff in the cases brought before the court. Not a single witness
called by ACS, not a single deputy commissioner, not a single director or
policy maker, not a single expert had looked at any of the case files of
any of the class members. The Commissioner of ACS testified that he
had not even directed anyone to look at the cases. So, de facto, the city
endorsed the policies.
In addition to calling class members, experts and ACS staff as witnesses, we also called advocates who had worked in the field for many
years to discuss their anecdotal experiences, which were so plentiful that
they supported the conclusion of a practice. The advocates also served
another important purpose for us in proving our case. They established
that the practices complained of had been brought to the city's attention
time and time again. Suddenly, the advocates' coffee-stained, handwritten notes of meetings with various Commissioners, and I thank God
that they were all meticulous enough to save them, were evidence in the
federal class action lawsuit.
I think Nicholson was a unique case for systemic reform: we believed that due to the nature of the lawsuit, because the safety of children
was involved, the case could not just be about proving that the city's
practices were unconstitutional or that they violated the civil rights of
battered mothers and their children. We firmly believed that in order to
prevail, we must educate, and challenge head-on some of society's most
deeply-held biases and judgments regarding domestic violence and child
welfare. And we had to show that what the city was doing was hurting
children. It was not a necessary component of our legal case, but we felt
that we needed to prove that.
The media was becoming interested in the case as well, and we saw
this as an opportunity to educate them and, through the media, the public.
The most prevalent judgment was, of course, "Why doesn't she leave?"
And the corollary in this context was that the mother who does not sepa-
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rate is a mother who is not protecting her children. This refrain that we
hear when members of general society are talking about battered mothers
always puzzles me, because we know that domestic violence homicides
frequently occur around issues of separation. I always ask people, you
know, we read articles in newspapers that talk about the death of battered
mothers and sometimes their children, but we never read an article that
says, "He killed her and the children because she told him she was staying." So, staying is many times protection. We felt at the trial that we
needed to make that point very clear. Fortunately, the people working at
ACS on domestic violence issues-there were three of them in this 2.3
billion dollar child welfare agency-were professionally sophisticated.
And, we were able to extract a lot of this evidence from them as well.
Very quickly, here are some other judgments that we had to challenge, "She didn't prosecute him when she had the chance." I don't
know what it's like here and the rest of the country, but in New York
City he gets out. He gets out pretty quickly. So, society judges her for
not going forward but if she does, for what? In all of the cases of our
class members, the abuser was set free and suffered no criminal consequences for his behavior, not even the man who so brutally assaulted
Sharwline.
Another one of the judgments, "She didn't go into shelter." Now
first, there's the question of whether she even had access to shelter.
Originally in our complaint, we included the city's failure to provide
adequate shelter as a cause of action. The judge, for whatever reason,
didn't want any part of that. So, he didn't bite and we didn't get to go
forward on that. But, second, even if she had access to shelter, there's
the question of whether shelter is in the best interests of the child. Shelter is relocating, removing a child from his or her community, changing
schools and every other familiar thing that may have contributed to the
child's resiliency.
We also had to challenge the notion that every child is irreparably
emotionally damaged and each in the same way by exposure to domestic
violence. Is witnessing domestic violence good for children? -- of course
not. But, as Dr. Stark I think will discuss a little later, if I'm not putting
him on the spot, even the research we have available now shows that
children are very resilient and the type and manner of any intervention
will affect that resiliency. So, we had our experts address that point.
I always think about this. You know, some children are devastated,
but some children grow up to live very productive lives. Some of you in
this room may even have been exposed to domestic violence as children.
There are 3.3 to 10 million children every year exposed to domestic violence and, clearly, not all of them suffer the level of dysfunction which
would require them to be taken from their parents.
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We also felt that we had to challenge the notion that removing children from their parents is erring on the side of safety. You hear that a
lot. There is a notion that foster care provides safety for children. This is
simply not true. It's not just me who says so with my anecdotal experience. I won't go through all of the data but it's out there. There are reports from the Department of Health and Human Services that the rate of
child maltreatment is more than seventy-five percent higher in foster care
than in the general population; that a child is twice as likely to die of
abuse in foster care as in the general population; that the rate of substantiated cases of sexual abuse in foster care is more than four times higher
than the rate in the general population, and so on and so forth.
Many of our clients' children suffered in foster care, ranging from
the physical abuse of Sharwline's son, to variousincidents of medical
neglect and emotional harm. The mothers' testimony about their children's experience in foster care was very powerful. But we did not only
use the mothers, the literature and the experts to help us establish the
trauma and danger of foster care.
We called the older children as witnesses. Listening to one fourteen
year-old describe her experience, Judge Weinstein and everyone in the
courtroom, including the city's attorneys, became teary-eyed and Judge
Weinstein had to call a ten-minute recess. Listening to her describe her
trauma of being taken from her mother and being placed in foster care
was one of the most wrenching moments in the trial.
Finally, we felt that we couldn't simply say the government is doing
it wrong, we believed that we had to say there's a way to do it right. And,
that there are ways to protect children without separating them from their
mothers. ACS provided us with some fodder for this argument.
From time to time in the 1990s, ACS had recognized systemic problems in handling of child welfare cases involving domestic violence. In
1999, they had a pilot project in which they placed a domestic violence
specialist in a local office, and this specialist looked at every case that
came in, and she helped the caseworker with the case. Out of seventyseven cases in the six-month period, there were only three removals.
There was a comparison study done of a Brooklyn site that had no domestic violence specialist. Removals were twenty-four percent in the
site that did not have a specialist.
Although the advocates who pressed ACS to conduct the pilot project will tell you that it was far from a perfect project, it was something
for us to show the court there's a way to do it right and ACS has chosen
not to do it right, because they refused to renew the pilot project when it
expired.
I think most compelling to the court was the fact that the federallyfunded National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges and other
well-respected professionals decried the use of removal of children as an
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intervention in child welfare cases involving domestic violence. No one
from the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges ever
testified for us. As a group representing judges, they didn't feel that they
could. But we put their treatise into evidence and got every expert to
recognize its principles.
Ultimately, Judge Weinstein said in his decision, in which he gave
the treatise a lot of weight, that ACS was not bound to follow best practices, it was only bound to follow the Constitution. However, he ruled its
failure to follow best practices bore on its justification for its behavior.
In other words, ACS was behaving punitively and couldn't really justify
it as being best for the child when there was this whole body of research
about what constituted best practices.
So here was our theory of the case: the city's behavior was wrong,
they are doing it harms children, and there is a way to do it right.
way
the
We boiled it down to what is technically part of the theory of the case but
what I sort of think of as the "bumper stickers"-this came about because, when we started getting media attention, to try to explain the complexity of these issues to reporters was really a challenge, so, we came up
with these simple concepts: remove the batterer, not the child; protect the
child by protecting the mother; witnessing domestic violence is bad, removing children is worse.
Of course, by now you all know that we won and we got a preliminary injunction. The injunction was very simple. It was only fourteen
paragraphs, but it was very powerful in its message. For example, the
federal court ordered that ACS could not remove a child when it could,
instead, remove the batterer. ACS could remove children without a court
order in only the rarest of circumstances. The city sought a stay of the
injunction and we defeated their motion by meticulously addressing each
paragraph of the injunction, looking at the trial record and saying, "Look,
Second Circuit. They say they already do that. So where is the irreparable harm to them of being held accountable for doing it?" We were very
pleased and excited that the Second Circuit declined to grant the stay.
We worked very hard on that particular brief, and Carolyn Kubitschek
withstood a particularly grueling oral argument.
An essential provision of the decision in the injunction was that
Judge Weinstein carved out a right to counsel for our clients and found
that they were being deprived of it. Now, in the case of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,' which is a Supreme Court case, the Supreme Court had rejected the general right to counsel for parents in cases
in which their parental rights were at stake, but had left the door open for
the right to counsel for certain sub-groups of parents.11 And, as far as I
10.
11.

452 U.S. 18 (1981).
Lassiter,452 U.S. at 31-32.
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know, Judge Weinstein is the only judge in the country who has walked
through that door and found a federal right to counsel for a certain group
of parents involved in a case in which their parental rights are at stake.
And he ordered that attorneys for class members be paid ninety dollars
an hour.
Ultimately, as a result of Nicholson, there was a domino effect. The
state court case addressing the issue of rates for assigned counsel was
revived; the state courts issued opinions which mirrored Judge
Weinstein's; and, the New York State Legislature amended state laws to
provide that effective January 1st of 2004, attorneys in all cases for all
indigent litigants, including children, in family and criminal court, are
paid seventy-five dollars an hour.
In its appellate travels, the Nicholson case made its way to the New
York State Court of Appeals, which is our highest court, when the Second Circuit certified questions of state law. So, at the end, it all came
back to In re Lonell J and some of its predecessor cases. The New York
Court of Appeals last October issued a sweeping decision clarifying the
law on removals without court order in all types of child welfare cases,
on what is necessary for a finding of child neglect, and, for our purposes
most importantly, ruled that a domestic violence victim is not presumptively a neglectful parent. 12 The New York Court of Appeals said that
there may be instances in which a domestic violence victim can be found
13
neglectful, but the circumstances must be very egregious.
My favorite part of that decision is where the court lists the factors
that must be considered when looking at the mother's conduct: risks of
leaving; risks of staying; risks of seeking assistance through government
channels; risks of criminally prosecuting the abuser; risks attendant to
relocation (going to shelter); the severity and frequency of the violence;
and, most importantly, the resources and options available to the mother.
The mother's conduct, ruled the court, must be judged in the context of
circumstances then and there existing. And that had not been done before. Now we have the highest court in the state saying to the state court
judges, "Listen! This is what you have to look at. You can't presume
she should have left. You can't presume she should have prosecuted.
You can't presume she should have gone to shelter."
The Nicholson decision had a domino effect locally and nationwide. ACS stopped removing children from battered mothers, and the
case spurred them to make vast improvements in their child welfare practice, some of which I hope will be institutionalized. Shortly after the
Nicholson ruling, the New York State Legislature passed a law requiring
specialized training for all child welfare workers throughout the state on
12.

Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 847 (N.Y. 2004).

13.

Id
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the Nicholson principles. Advocates had pursued that legislation, unsuccessfully, for many years. I'm told that Congress gave renewed funding
to the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges to explore
best practices in child welfare cases involving domestic violence in part
because of Nicholson. We have heard reports from domestic violence
and child welfare agencies throughout the country about the effect of
Nicholson, how it led to new programs and new state funding.
In December we settled the case after Judge Weinstein indicated
that he thought enough had been done. This was after we won in the
New York State Court of Appeals. ACS also has a new commissioner
who did not take the lawsuit personally and was willing to agree to abide
by the principles set forth in the decision-both the letter of the principles and their spirit. If the city behaves itself, the case will finally be
dismissed in September 2005.
Ultimately, it's hard to say what the day-to-day effect of the lawsuit
on New York's family courts will be. Ever the skeptic, I await a backlash or unintended consequences. Some judges in New York appear to
be unhappy with the case, and I'll talk about that a little more later, believing that it places too many restrictions on them. However, there can
be no dispute that the case has had wide-reaching implications.

